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 “‘I like,’ she said, ‘anything that flickers.’” Those are the words of 
Angela Carter, transmitted by her literary executor Susannah Clapp, 
in the preface to the posthumously published collection of short 
stories American Ghosts and Old World Wonders.1 The statement 
seems a particularly apt introduction to Susan Hiller’s oeuvre, and 
in particular the automatic writing project, installation and artist’s 
book Sisters of Menon (1972/1979). Exploring the margins of 
representability, pushing beyond the limits and limitations of 
retinality, lending a voice to the dead or incorporating oral accounts 
of anonymous strangers, all conjure the ghostly quality that is 
typical of both the subject matter and the means and materials of 
Hiller’s art. Her oeuvre is engaged in an on-going dialogue with 
psychoanalysis, whose archaeological investigations into the 
unconscious it mimics in its attempt to unearth censored strata of 
cultural signification. Yet in mimicry, according to Walter Benjamin, 
the copy does not leave its “original” unaffected.2 Writing on Hiller’s 
work with materials from the Freud Museum, Denise Robinson 
draws attention to the willful blurring of archive and debris (an 
assortment of uncategorized objects from Freud’s possessions is 
displayed in custom-made archaeological collecting boxes), the 
highly invested institutionalized space of the museum and the 
private sphere of domesticity (the Freud Museum in London is 
housed in Sigmund Freud’s last residence).3 Such blurring is typical 
of Hiller’s overall treatment of psychoanalysis in both her art and 
writing: recalling and challenging its precarious positioning as 
science on which Freud insisted strongly, Hiller strives to restore 
psychoanalysis to its darker, devalued, repressed roots in myth and 
storytelling, and even animism and the paranormal. In his essay 
“The ‘Uncanny’,” Freud concedes that, in its efforts to lay bare the 
unspoken and (almost) unspeakable, psychoanalysis may well be 
viewed by some as unsettling and “uncanny” in its own right, by 
association.4 Thus, psychoanalysis itself also appears to possess the 
flickering quality favoured by Carter and systematically cultivated 
by Hiller. 
Hiller’s concern with the cultural and optical unconscious 
ventures into the territory of the culturally and intellectually abject. 
Hiller’s mindful collection and integration into her work of materials 
including Punch and Judy performances (An Entertainment, 1990), 
narratives of UFO sightings sourced from the Internet (Witness, 
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2000), near-death experiences in a variety of languages (Clinic, 
2004), present an affront to current aesthetic and intellectual 
sensibilities. Hiller’s resistance to value judgement in dealing with 
“commonly discarded [and] distrusted” material,5 often combined 
with active audience participation, renders her work difficult to 
assimilate for the art critical establishment. This difficulty, however, 
also highlights the radical potential of the culturally abject. Unlike 
the bodily abject, so easily accommodated in the popular media 
landscape, for example in the horror film genre6 or, more recently, 
in primetime broadcasts of plastic surgery, the culturally abject has 
possibly inherited the avant-gardist promise of the abject in its 
literary evocations, as was envisaged by Kristeva in Powers of 
Horror. Originating in a distinctly feminist engagement with visual 
culture, Hiller’s work unearths the repressed permeability not of the 
fragile psychical entity of the body, but of other unstable yet prized 
constructs, such as rationality and consciousness, aesthetic value 
and artistic canons. Hiller refers to this precarious positioning of her 
oeuvre as “paraconceptual,”7 just sideways of conceptualism and 
neighbouring the paranormal, a devalued site of culture where 
women and the feminine have been conversely privileged. Most 
interestingly, in the hybrid field of “paraconceptualism,” neither 
conceptualism nor the paranormal are left intact: as in the case of 
the abject, the prefix “para-“ symbolizes the force of contamination 
through a proximity so great that it threatens the soundness of all 
boundaries. 
Second-wave feminism has both tapped into the paranormal 
and raised awareness of its essentialist perils. Women’s affinity to 
the “beyond” is too comfortably reducible to a confirmation and 
enforcement of their marginality, even if it also serves to register 
feminine (sometimes even feminist) dissent.8 Without scholarly 
poststructuralist support, anti-rationalism and irrationality have 
been too easy to conflate, sometimes prompting writers and artists 
to supplement their practice with pre-emptively corrective 
commentaries to ward off essentialist misreadings. Hiller resists this 
trend: although vocal and extremely articulate, she is self-
consciously light-handed in her treatment of her own work, careful 
not to correct extant interpretations or appear to be providing the 
definitive one. The closest she comes to intervening in her work’s 
reception is by protesting that her fascinating albeit underestimated 
subject matter attracts more critical attention than the material and 
conceptual means by which it is transformed.9 The prefix ‘para-’ 
designates an arena of both danger and possibility that, to 
complicate matters further, threatens to lure the spectator/reader 
astray, to deceive her into sidestepping the issue at hand.  
“Paraconceptualism,” therefore, is an uncanny practice par 
excellence, not simply because of its adjacency to the paranormal, 
but thanks to its evocation of the repressed periphery of culture.10 
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In this chapter, I will not be privileging subject over form, 
matter over material. Rather, I will be exploring a space of in-
betweeness, beyond and adjacent to the works themselves. I will 
attempt to locate Hiller’s practice in a feminist tradition of 
interventions in visual culture, and in culture through the visual. At 
the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, I will try to show how 
Hiller’s work challenges and expands orthodox or stable definitions 
of feminist art history, theory and practice.  My interpretation of 
Sisters of Menon unfolds against the backdrop of feminist readings 
of Hiller’s production of the seventies and eighties, while being 
indebted to them.11 Such tensions are typical of the last thirty-five 
years and are most manifest in the life and work of many feminist 
artists who started their career in the late sixties and early 
seventies, and art historians who were either involved in the project 
of overhauling art history or have been working with the tools that 
feminist art theory developed. Both groups have been negotiating 
the space between the search for another subject and the 
destitution of the subject. Something of this tension is also implicit 
in the label “identity politics,” which in spite of being severely, 
probably irredeemably, disrupted by psychoanalysis, is still valuable 
as a marker of difference – not sexual difference per se, but the 
aesthetic, countercultural and critical difference of feminism’s 
historical interventions in the arts. Rosemary Betterton’s reading of 
Sisters of Menon acknowledges its allusion to the historical second-
wave “sisterhood”: the work is embedded in the sexual politics of 
the 1970s and anticipates feminist philosophy of the 1990s.12 
Feminist theory after the second wave has been faced with a 
negotiation between different historical moments and their 
respective agendas, a negotiation which often recedes into a yet 
unsettled tension between radical identity politics and flexible 
models of identification, in which the subject is almost emptied out. 
There is a recognition, in Hiller’s work, that this tension needs to be 
at least tolerated, if not sustained, rather than resolved. Hiller 
resists the facile assertion “the object of art is without subject”13 to 
reveal a crowded space where the authorial “I” is muffled by the 
voices from the other side/ the side of the other.  
The second space of in-betweeness that will be examined and 
which is the starting point of my particular interpretation of Sisters 
of Menon, is between Hiller’s visual work and a not-quite 
supplemental, on-going commentary on it,  as well as on wider 
issues of visual culture, theory, and practice. Although classified as 
a visual artist and having abandoned the scholarly methods and 
aims of social anthropology in which she had been trained, Hiller’s 
work consists of both in equal measure. Critics, including Hiller 
herself, have often noted the continuities between Hiller the 
anthropologist and Hiller the artist, especially in terms of the 
preparatory work – the “research stage” of art practice where, as 
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Denise Robinson puts it, “the collector shadows the artist”14 
continuously. In this shadow cast on a chosen enterprise, Hiller may 
be positioned as an intermediary -- the learned go-between in the 
midst of different genres and discourses – and as a medium for the 
culturally repressed. Considered in this manner, Hiller’s body of 
work makes a compelling argument against metalanguage, staging 
non-hierarchical encounters between theory and practice, art, 
anthropology, philosophy and psychoanalysis.  
Sisters of Menon exemplifies this interdiscursive interstice in 
its structure: the work consists of a collection of twenty pages of 
automatic writing, typed transcripts, and four Notes, each of which 
reflects on the work in a different style and tone, while also forming 
part of it. Sisters of Menon was completed in 1979, when Hiller 
undertook the transcription of the retrieved automatic scripts and 
produced the accompanying Notes. The work thus spans a crucial 
decade for feminist art practice and extends into the 1980s, when 
Sisters of Menon was published as an artist’s book in 1983 by 
Gimpel Fils. It has been exhibited as an installation, where the 
scripts were arranged in cruciform, with the Notes and transcripts 
positioned at the edges of the horizontal axis. Although clearly 
numbered and arranged in sequence, the cruciform shape of the 
installation discourages linear reading; what is more, not all 
installments are equally visible to the spectator without having to 
crouch down or stand on her toes, thus necessitating the physical 
collaboration of the audience, as Hiller’s works often do.  
The shape of the cross is repeated in the background of the 
typed transcripts and appears again as a grapheme within the 
automatic script. All automatically produced marks that do not 
correspond with letters are replaced in the transcripts by dashes, 
apart from the encircled cross or “X,” which is copied intact. Hiller 
observes that this symbol provides a link between the work and the 
location where the scripts were made. The encircled cross is a 
Cathar symbol while the French village of Loupien, where she was 
staying at the time, is situated in a Cathar region:  “Cathars 
followed a Gnostic tradition, which leads to interesting ideas about 
religion and gender.”15 Gnosticism consists of a wide, loosely 
associated group of mystical teachings and sects, which were 
sometimes perceived as a rival to orthodox Christianity and “which 
professed to offer ‘gnosis,’ saving knowledge or enlightenment, 
conveyed in various myths which sought to explain the origin of the 
world and of the human soul and the destiny of the latter.”16  
Certain Gnostic sects “speak of the feminine element in the divine, 
celebrat[ing] God as Father and Mother.”17 Salvaged in spite of 
their illegibility, the crosses may also be considered a sympathetic 
nod to the makeshift signature of the illiterate. In the book, the 
Notes also “frame” the automatic scripts, with the first two pla
at the beginning and the rest at the end. 
ced 
Notes I serves as an 
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introduction to the work, explaining its method (automatic writing 
combined with gestural automatism, resulting in hybrid letter-
drawings) and its history: the scripts were produced 
“automatically,” in a state of altered consciousness (which, 
however, as Hiller insists, “didn’t seem freaky”)18 during the artist’s 
stay in Loupien. The second page elaborates on significant details 
that begin to erode the notion of subjectivity, questioning the 
division between subject and object. The scripts had been lost and
only “re-appeared … almost exactly seven years after their 
transmission.”
 
livion “automatically,” as if of their own accord. 
19 They were not rediscovered, but found their way 
back from ob
The Greek word “automatos” contains the meaning “self-
acting,” 20 with the “self” being, however, devoid of consciousness. 
This is where the Freudian uncanniness of automata and 
automatism lies, and not in the observer’s intellectual uncertainty 
as to whether something is animate or inanimate, dead or alive, as 
Ernst Jentsch proposed.21 The handwriting and “voice” in which the 
inscriptions were made are not Hiller’s usual, characteristic style, 
even though her hands did the writing. When used, the possessive 
pronoun (“’my’ hands”) is suspended in quotation marks. Notes III 
includes a schematic “analysis of the relationship between 
Automatism and Creativity” along gender lines, with scientists, 
poets and artists being gendered male, corresponding to the 
female-identified mediums and lunatics respectively. Typical of the 
feminist epistemological and art historical critiques of its time, the 
partition is challenged in the work itself, where the dividing lines are 
crossed often and nonchalantly. Whereas the automatic scripts 
stand for the artist’s participation in an altered state of 
consciousness, the Notes that frame it reveal a systematic and 
informed reflection on automatism and the work itself: Sisters of 
Menon proposes that the two sets of positions (scientist and artist 
vs. medium and lunatic) need not be incommensurable but can be 
occupied alternatively and at will, while at the same time 
acknowledging that social and cultural conditions rob certain social 
groups of such flexibility. Notes IV appears to have been created for 
the book, being absent from the installation, and highlights issues 
that came into prominence in Hiller’s oeuvre since the completion of 
Sisters of Menon in 1979. The work, that may, or may not, be read 
as “primitive” self-expression or an “‘occult’ phenomenon,” poses 
and responds to the question: “Who is this one?”22 Already 
embroiled in the dissolution of subject positions, Hiller tackles this 
question in the first person singular, which is however again 
provisional, suspended in quotation marks: “‘I’ feel more like a 
series of activities than an impermeable, corporeal unit … or rather, 
‘I’ AM NOT A CONTAINER.”23 
Approaching Sisters of Menon from the seemingly explanatory 
periphery of the Notes towards its more equivocal depths, the 
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viewer performs a privileged reading/viewing of the work, with the 
name “Menon” as its undecipherable navel. “Menon” remains 
ungendered and is never identified apart from through undefinable 
shifters (i.e., personal pronouns but also terms such as 
“here/there,” “now/ then,” that only acquire meaning in the context 
of a known situation) and self-referential predicates:  
 
1. -----/ who is this one/ I am this one/ Menon is   
2. Menon is this one/ you are this one/ 
 
Shifting shifters highlight the democratizing aspect of automatism, 
spelled out by Surrealism. Hiller has described her art practice as 
populist, in spite of its embeddedness in critical theory; her art 
remains simultaneously approachable and capable of transforming 
the abstract models with which it engages, because it is not tied 
“illustrationally to theory.”24  Notes IV, the last page of the book, 
explicitly addresses issues of duration and endings. It fades into 
sentence fragments buffered by ellipses, seemingly left to be 
completed (or not) by the reader: “…………. widest possible social 
implications … art history … accessible to all …………….”  
Menon is introduced only relationally and, crucially, not in 
terms of either patrilineality or matrilineality but laterally, on an 
equal plane, along sibling lines: 
 
3. I am the sister of Menon/ I am your sister/ the sister of -- 
everyone’s sister/ I am Menon’s sister  
18. we are the sisters of Menon/ everyone is the sister/ 
everyone is the sister/ love oh the sisters/ 
 
Lucy Lippard has noted that “Menon” is an anagram of “nomen,” 
Latin for name,25 while Hiller has playfully suggested “no men”;26 
the automatic message indeed reinforces the vacuity of “the Name 
of the Father” not by excluding men (which, strictly speaking, it 
doesn’t do and which alone would have been inconsequential), but 
by questioning the symbolic function of paternity and filiality. In this 
kinship network, there is no marriage, no exchange of women and 
thus no economy, either in social terms or on the level of the 
Symbolic Order.27 
 
9. Menon/ we three sisters are your sister/ this is the nothing 
that we are/ 
10. the riddle is the sister of the zero/ we are the mother  
11. of men/ we are the sister of men/ o the sisters 
 
Automatic transmission and the reception of automatically produced 
texts break with rationalist codes of interpretation to create a 
semiotic inflation where seemingly contradictory propositions are 
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valid at the same time. Lacan ties kinship and especially the 
exchange of women to language: both are “imperative for the group 
in [their] forms, but unconscious in [their] structure.”28 Kinship lays 
down not only the social but also the symbolic law. On the level of 
kinship, such semiotic inflation becomes almost incestuous: 
we/you/I are both the mother and the sister of men (or of Menon: 
“we are the sister of men/o the sisters”). Already a few clues in 
Sisters of Menon allude to the Oedipus myth as known via 
Sophocles and, of course, Freud. Like Sisters of Menon that is spun 
off from a question about identity to a mystery surrounding familial 
provenance, Oedipus Rex starts as a virtual whodunit, whose 
driving question (“Who murdered the late King?”) soon becomes 
“Who is Oedipus?,” and is then promptly translated into: ‘Whose 
son is he?’29  
The strongest allusion to Oedipus, however, comes in the last 
instalment of the automatic script: 
 
20. ------/ we are your sisters from THEBES/ thebes30 
 
Hiller draws the attention of the reader/viewer to the last word of 
the automatic scripts at the very beginning, suggesting that it 
“provides a clue, for the ancient Greeks (I’m told) had only one 
term for writing and drawing.”31 Liddell and Scott confirm this 
double signification of “grapho” and list numerous other meanings, 
including – in an uncanny evocation of Oedipus’ detective family 
romance – that of being “indicted.”32 The name of the city is first 
written in capitals and then repeated in lower scale, as if in two 
different registers, with the final “s” of the second inscription drawn 
out beyond the edge of the page, towards the body doing the 
writing. Finally we are given a hint, if not exactly to the identity of 
Menon, then to the context and scope of this investigation and this 
clue is the reiterated name of a location, conflated with questions of 
identity: “‘I’ am a location.”33 
Shoshana Felman calls the Oedipus myth the “specimen story 
of psychoanalysis,” arguing that Freud’s rendition of it in The 
Interpretation of Dreams not only forms the foundation of his 
theory of sexuation and sexuality, but that it also textually enacts 
the compulsion to repeat, and presents the death drive as the 
generative force in psychoanalysis.34 This centrality of the death 
drive may be interpreted in different ways. A fundamental 
characteristic of Hiller’s work is what she refers to as “the scary 
element,”35 usually cast in terms of the uncanny: that which should 
have remained hidden but is uncovered, the return of the repressed 
that is revealed to be already familiar: 36 “MESSAGES SUPPRESSED 
BY THE SELF DO NOT CEASE TO EXIST. MESSAGES SUPPRESSED 
BY THE CULTURE DO NOT CEASE TO EXIST.”37 The work of 
automatic mark-making is no mere retrieval of the repressed from 
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the unconscious but a journey into the unknown that is known all 
too well, which is the very definition of the uncanny.38 If what is at 
stake in the “unheimliche,” this familiar and – in its exemplary form 
– familial and domestic unhomely, is ultimately not the castration 
complex but the death drive, then every return, which is a return 
home, is by definition deathbound. 
The interstitial focus of my interpretation of Sisters of Menon 
is mirrored disjunctively in the doubling of the place-name 
“Thebes.” Roszika Parker’s 1983 interview with Hiller goes very 
much against the grain of automatism and the numerous 
interpretations of Hiller’s work, to argue that Sisters of Menon not 
only invites interpretation but “insist[s] that we decipher” it. Hiller 
concedes to an extent by offering a possible interpretation: Sisters 
of Menon “reformulates the encounter between the Sphinx and 
Oedipus.”39 Confusingly, in other discussions of the work, Oedipus 
is often elided. In an interview with Stuart Morgan, Hiller identifie
Thebes without hesitation as an ancient Egyptian burial ground: 
“[it] is of course the necropolis in Egypt which undoubtedly I had 
already read about.”
s 
40 In the Egyptian Thebes, now Luxor, there is 
a precinct dedicated to Memnon, son of Eos (Dawn), a Greek 
mythological hero whose name is only a letter away from Menon. 
This similarity is left without comment, while Hiller mentions her 
interest in hieroglyphs, secret languages and the precarious link 
between voice and subjectivity. Legend has it that the Northern 
statue of the two “Colossi of Memnon” flanking the gateway of the 
mortuary temple of Amenhotep III used to emit a high note at 
daybreak in salutation of the Greek hero’s mother. In the interview, 
Hiller slips from the locus of the Oedipal drama to the Egyptian 
necropolis, from Oedipus’s arrogant eloquence to the inarticulate 
lament of a son for his mother, unearthing a near-homonym 
between the mythical hero and the “obscure navel” of Sisters of 
Menon. The interstice between the two Thebes partakes in the 
uncanny ambiguity of the voice: both the “medium of the subject’s 
transparent self-presence” and the “opaque stain” that undermines 
it.41 
In Oedipus Philosopher, Jean-Joseph Goux proposes that the 
formulation of the Oedipus complex in psychoanalysis is constitutive 
of the “conscious/unconscious cleavage.”42 Even more significantly, 
the impact of the Oedipean drama is symptomatic of “the mode of 
subjectivity that characterizes Cartesian societies,”43 a mode of 
subjectivity that is assumed, interrogated and to a degree 
problematized by psychoanalysis, but which pre-exists and survives 
it. Goux argues that ultimately Freudian psychoanalysis “lacks the 
articulated conception of what may signify a surpassing of the 
Oedipus complex,”44 and I think that Hiller implies the same. In 
rearticulating the Oedipean drama as the Oedipus complex, Freud 
censors the flickering quality of psychoanalysis and attempts to 
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violently resolve its fecund ambivalence between science and art, 
psychology and magic. The cleavage between the conscious and the 
unconscious is no mere partition, but institutes a range of 
hierarchical relations, placing heteronormative genitality above 
diffuse sexuality (the Foucauldian “polymorphous perversity”), 
sacrificing the pre-Oedipal affinity with the maternal body for the 
sake of networks of kinship, privileging logos over the 
unrepresentable and the paranormal. The “mode of subjectivity” 
that is ushered in by the Greek Oedipus and that is envisaged as 
the outcome of a resolved Oedipus complex comes at the price of 
personal and political repression. Sisters of Menon rethinks the 
encounter between Oedipus and the Sphinx by giving voice to a 
different kind of disarticulated subjectivity. It does so significantly 
by reminding the audience that there is more than one Thebes, by 
prying open the lag between the Greek and the older Egyptian city, 
the locus of Oedipus’s intellectual victory and the burial site that 
gets buried – repressed – by what Oedipus and his warped family 
romance come to stand for. In order for the specimen story to 
function as such, it has to be forgotten in practice:45 Sisters of 
Menon only de-Oedipalizes subjectivity through the calculated 
forgetfulness that it prompts and in retelling the story with a 
difference. In tracing the Oedipean “autocentered” subject in the 
Western philosophical tradition, Goux pays special attention to 
Hegel, who is credited with the transformation of Oedipus into “a 
shadowless, fully inaugural figure”46 and of his encounter with the 
Sphinx into “the primitive scene of philosophy.”47 Hegel collapses 
the Egyptian with the Greek Sphinx, and casts the encounter as a 
confrontation between two different regimes of the symbolic, out of 
which the rational hero emerges triumphant, but having sacrificed 
otherness: ‘The light of consciousness, which is consciousness of 
self, obliterates all enigmatic alterity, suppressing the dimension of 
the unconscious’.48 The birth of Western philosophy coincides with 
“the exit of Egypt.”49 Sisters of Menon not only effects a return to 
the past and an exit from Europe, but juxtaposes the two Thebes, 
commemorating their weighty difference and rewriting the 
conclusion of Oedipean drama. The implications of this piece are not 
only feminist but also psychoanalytic, philosophical and 
postcolonial. 
Feminist readings of Hiller’s work tend to highlight its critique 
of subjectivity from the point of view of the feminine. I have striven 
to show that its challenges are far more far-reaching, or perhaps 
that through rethinking her self as an ambiguously positioned 
subject (a woman, a foreigner, Jewish), Hiller addresses clusters of 
cultural issues with multiple and unexpected ramifications. Her 
“improper”50 use of self-portraiture would make an apposite closing 
for the present discussion, especially as it elaborates on insights 
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gained through the kind of automatic mark-making inaugurated by 
Sisters of Menon.  
Hiller’s work Sometimes I think I’m a Verb Instead of a 
Pronoun (1981-82), if not exactly a straight-forward exercise in 
self-portraiture, is unequivocally described as an autobiographical 
work. The work belongs to a series of photomat self-portraits 
produced mainly in the early 1980s, consisting of blown up passport 
pictures partially covered by automatic script and paint. Sometimes 
I Think I’m a Verb Instead of a Pronoun consists of twelve panels, 
each comprising eight frames (two foursomes of photomat pictures) 
that have been written and painted on and consequently 
rephotographed. The conventions of identification photography are 
thwarted on two levels: the photographed subject either averts her 
gaze or, as in this work, presents body parts other than the face to 
the camera, while the photographic print is purposely veiled in 
writing and colour. The automatism of the illegible script is relayed 
by the absence of a seeing, conscious agent behind the camera of 
the photomat. Hiller relates, “Clearly what’s happening here has got 
to do with the question of, say, presence or absence of the female 
subject, the female person who is the subject of these works, 
namely me.”51 Hiller identifies the title as a quotation by American 
General and President Ulysses S. Grant. Once again, the question of 
self-identity passes through the other in a most pronounced way: 
the feminist artist encounters a dead father of a nation, not simply 
a sovereign figure but a symbol of sovereignty. 
Yet Grant carves out an odd patriarchal figure. Emerging from 
the American Civil War as hero, his presidency is customarily 
described in terms of confusion, inefficiency and impotence. His 
biography on the White House website claims that he “provided 
neither vigour nor reform” and “seemed bewildered….  One visitor 
to the White House noted ‘a puzzled pathos, as of a man with a 
problem before him of which he does not understand the terms.’”52 
Following the trajectory from the Greek to the Egyptian Thebes, 
from Oedipus to Memnon and then to President Grant, we also track 
another transition. Hiller’s automatic script morphs from relative 
intelligibility to a primordial cryptolinguistic mark-making whose 
meaning may be “read” as iconic (as shapes that may or may not 
evoke objects, as clouds do when observed persistently and at 
leisure) but which is primarily indexical.  That is to say, it conveys 
nothing other than the act of mark-making.53 The index does not 
only sidestep language but, in doing so, disrupts the authorial 
function of the subject and dispels its authoritative aura. Ulysses 
Grant, named after another mythological fortune-seeker, becomes 
the anti-Oedipus, marking the point of dissolution of the Western 
subject just like Oedipus marked its emergence. A year before his 
death, Grant was diagnosed with throat cancer that resulted in the 
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complete loss of his voice. Reduced to communicating principally 
through writing, he wrote in a note to his physician:  
 
I do not sleep though I sometimes doze a little. If up I am 
talked to and my efforts to answer cause pain. The fact is I 
think I am a verb instead of a personal pronoun. A verb is 
anything that signifies to be; to do; or to suffer. I signify all 
three.54 
 
On the brink of death, the index overtakes the symbol (the 
intelligible sign), the body overwhelms the subject, verbs take over 
from pronouns. In Sometimes I Think I’m a Verb Instead of a 
Pronoun, sensations speak louder than words – the subject is flesh 
again, beneath and beyond language. Just as the script devolves 
into indecipherability, the body parts replacing the face in the 
photomat frames now remain just that, fragmented, barely 
identifiable, not yet stapled together by the little other (objet petit 
a) of the mirror stage.55 More than any work from Hiller’s series of 
photomat self-portraits, Sometimes I Think I’m a Verb Instead of a 
Pronoun celebrates the sensual pleasures of painting with thick, 
textured layers of colour – pleasures that were prohibited in 
orthodox feminist art practice, especially of the post-minimalist 
conceptualist tradition in which Hiller is usually (albeit not entirely 
comfortably) classified: “The Law of the Mother” was “Thou shalt 
not paint,” as Judith Mastai whimsically put it.56  
This is not another clichéd narrative of the biological birth-
death division, nor the spiritual or mythological birth-death-rebirth 
cycle. Hiller’s quest for the repressed magic of psychoanalytic 
intuition runs parallel to the investigation of Jean Laplanche. In Life 
and Death in Psychoanalysis, Laplanche looks into the 
“transformation into something different” of “the biological polarity 
of life and death …when it is transposed to the level of the psychical 
apparatus.”57 Her automatic script, whether legible or illegible, is 
not simply a Laplanchian “enigmatic signifier,” the signifier de-
signified, bereft of its signified but still able to signify to.58 Rather it 
marks the intertextual point where meaningful and resonant 
mythological, aesthetic and theoretical allusions converge. Thus, the 
ethical imperative of psychoanalysis articulated by Freud in 
“Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” as “if you would 
endure life, be prepared for death” and elaborated in his 
correspondence (what Laplanche calls his “’condolence’ letters”),59 
is spun into a cluster of different, less coherent – or rather “fruitfully 
incoherent”60 – propositions: listen, recover, complicate, 
recirculate; complete forgetting is impossible; to remember is to 
always also mourn (and vice versa); there is, fortunately, mor
than one 
e 
Thebes.  
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Jean Fisher claims that the motif of the “suspension of the 
rational subject … restores the transmissibility of culture” by 
allowing one “to grasp the traumatic void of meaning that haunts 
our memories of the everyday.”61 Hiller’s most recent work 
exemplifies this expert mediation entailed in the conveyance of the 
unsayable: The J-Street Project consists of a film and photographic 
series documenting public spaces with Jewish names around 
Germany. The premise and its execution seem deliberately – 
misleadingly – straightforward. The juxtaposition of these disparate, 
ordinary environments is burdened by the lack of commentary at 
least as much as it is by the guilty elimination of the culture and the 
people after which the streets were named. Their elliptical character 
is disturbing: “I always wanted to ‘catch’ people in the gaps 
between discourses and the gaps between frames.”62 In mapping 
out the shadows of the familiar, it is unclear whether it is bridges or 
traps that Hiller sets up. Questions of and around identity are posed 
only to be obscured and infinitely deferred. Sisters of Menon can be 
read as an exercise in cartography sending its spectator/reader on a 
wild goose chase. The most persistent participants may discover 
new and instructive trajectories, traversing the Mediterranean 
southwards, crossing between mythology and psychoanalysis, 
unearthing the forgotten, intuitive aspects of the Freudian episteme, 
and returning to an altered Oedipean configuration, where the 
Sphinx is let be.  
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